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THE AFRICAN MINING VISION: PERSPECTIVES





This article argues that, after the recent boom, the African Mining Vision
(AMV), upon making development central in the extractive industry, is a
paradigm whose time has come. We hypothesize that the Vision is forward-
looking with a robust ideational foundation, able to seize emerging policy
windows towards lasting paradigm shift for Africa’s extractive sector. The
article presents a dynamic framework for analysing policy change in the
extractive sector in Africa, based on the power of ideas and interests networks.
While the crisis in the sector presents an opportunity, the article analyses the
binding political economy constraints that African governments would have
to overcome at the global, regional and country levels to implement the
transformative ideas of the AMV. The article presents a matrix systematically
analysing possible scenarios for implementing the Africa Mining Vision. The
implementation of the AMV would likely be non-linear. Vested interests,
including resistance to change and diversity of country contexts, could lead
to varied outcomes in the implementation of AMV in the short and medium
terms.




Mineral-rich Africa faces its strongest ever headwind with the adoption
of the Africa Mining Vision (AMV) in 2009. The prolonged fall in
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commodity prices presents a challenging environment for implementing
the vision. The endorsed continental framework aims to bring about a
“transparent, equitable and optimal exploitation of mineral resources
to underpin broad-based sustainable growth and socio-economic
development”.1 Demand-side factors driven by slowdown of growth in
China, which consumes over 50 per cent of all metals, as well as industry-
specific forces underpinned by oversupply and competition for market
share, together have significantly weakened mineral prices, since their
recent high of 2011.2
The depressing volatility is hardly a new phenomenon. Commodity
prices oftenrise and fall in painful patterns of vulnerability, risks and
crises.3 The sharp and prolonged nature of the current fall in prices has
provoked a rethink of the ideational foundation of governance in Africa’s
extractive sector. While it remains unclear for how long prices will stay
very low, the slump is already revealing a fundamental crack in the
externally-driven revenue-first model, which has continued to mark
mining regimes in Africa with its unrealistic assumption of sustained
high commodity prices.
The adoption of a continental strategy is to do business differently,
integrating the broader extractive industry into the local, national,
regional and global value chains. As a new initiative, the AMV is building
its credibility as a transformative framework, competing with other
long-established regimes in the sector. The falling commodity prices
and the ensuing fiscal crises are challenging many mineral-rich African
countries. At the same time, many more African countries are entering
the league of mineral-rich and dependent countries with massive
discoveries of oil, gas and minerals. It remains unclear whether the
development orientations embodied in the vision are robust enough
for countries to adopt the strategies without scaring away needed
external investors. Yet given its holistic focus, the depressing context
makes it even more imperative to advance the implementation of the
long-term development priorities of Africa’s mineral sector, consistent
with the post-2015 development agenda.
1 The African Union Commission, ‘‘The Africa Mining Vision’’ (2009), p. 1.
2 The World Bank,‘‘Commodity Markets Outlook’’ (October 2015),  Washington
D.C.
3 Bain, A., “The New World  of  Crises  and  Crises  Management:  Implications  for
Policy Making and Research”, Review of Policy Research (2013), 26(4), pp. 367-
377.
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This article argues that, after the boom, the AMV focus on putting
development front and centre in the extractive industry is imminent.
Our central hypothesis is that the vision is forward-looking enough
with robust ideational foundation for seizing emerging policy windows
to bring about lasting paradigm shift for Africa’s extractive sector,
anchored on its broad-based development. The assumption guiding
the analysis is that ideas matter in policy change and to the extent to
which they organize interests, actors, as well as create power and seize
opportunities presented for change. We also take for granted that crises
generate “framing contests”, including varied interpretation of events,
their causes, responsibilities and lessons learned for informing and
shaping the path of future policies.
We contribute to the growing literature on ideas and policy change.
There are sparse number of studies that systematically explore the
dynamics of idea formation, as well as crises and regime change in the
extractive sector. Fewer have focused on the hierarchy of change both
in substantive and procedural terms – clearly distinguishing between
shifts in normative ideas and implementation mechanisms. As an overall
objective, the article analyses the options for establishing AMV as an
enduring paradigm capable of effectively responding to boom and bust
cycles of commodity markets. We adopt a discursive institutionalist
approach, framing ideas as sources of power for policy change. We
specifically adopt a conceptual framework for assessing the emerging
contextual dynamics for implementing the AMV.
The remainder of this article is organized as follow. Section 2 reviews
the literature on the role of ideas in mining regimes, providing the
theoretical arguments used in building the conceptual framework
underpinning this article.Section 3 presents the Africa Mining Vision
as a new social contract. The conceptual framework presented in section
4 is then employed in section 5 to analyse the challenges and
opportunities presented by the current crises facing the sector in Africa.
Section 5 also evaluates the different permutations or scenarios of
change, while section 6 is the conclusion.
2.  UNDERSTANDING THE POWER OF IDEAS
IN MINING REGIMES
Change remains a permanent fixture of life, goes a popular adage. Public
policy-making is oftenmarked by continuity and stability, with change
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occurring rarely and incrementally.4 In explaining the mechanics of
change and evolution in public policies, several studies have underscored
the role and influence of ideas.5 Flathman (1966) notes how the ideas
that policy makers hold influence decision making.6 In studying policy
change, the concept of policy paradigm has been applied widely in
many sectors and fields.7 Basically, the term captures established beliefs,
values and attitudes behind framing of public policy problems.8
Paradigm shifts occupy one-end of a continuum describing the potential
power of ideas.9
In his seminal work on policy change in Britain, Peter Hall argued
that policy paradigms establish the broad goals behind policy, the
related problems or puzzles that policy-makers want to solve and the
kind of instruments to achieve the goals set for the policy.10 Individuals
in a policy subsystem hold a “deep core” of basic values and beliefs
4 Wolfgang Streeck & Katheleen, Thelen, “Introduction:  Institutional  Change  in
Advanced  Political  Economies’’,  in  Wolfgang,  Streeck and Katheleen Thelen,
Beyond  Continuity:  Institutional  Change  in Advanced Political Economies (eds)
(OUP, 2005); Charles Lindblom, The Science of Muddling Through. Public
Administration Review, 19 (1959), pp. 79-89; Paul Schulman, “Non-incremental
policy making: Notes toward an alternative”, American Political Science Review,
69 (1975), pp. 1354-1370.
5 Daniel Beìland, Martin B. Carstensen and Leonard Seabrooke, “Ideas, Power,
and Public Policy, ”  Journal of European Public Policy, 23 (3) (2016), pp. 315-
317; Elizabeth Shanahan, Michael Jones and Mark  McBeth (2011). “Policy
Narratives and Policy Processes”, Policy Stud. J. 39 (2011), pp. 535–561; Frank
Baumgartner and Bryan Jones, “Agenda Dynamics and Policy Subsystems”, The
Journal of Politics, Vol. 53, No. 4 (1991), pp. 1044-74; John Kingdon, “Agendas,
Alternatives  and  Public  Policies” (University  of Michigan 1984).
6 Richard Flathman, The Public Interest: An Essay Concerning the Normative
Discourse of Politics (New York: Willey, New York, 1996).
7 Mark Carson, Tom Burns and Dolores Calvo, Paradigms in Public Policy: Theory
and Practice of Paradigm Shifts in the EU (Peter Lang Publishers, Berlin, 2009);
Pierre-Marc, “Reassessing the Concept of Policy Paradigm: Aligning Ontology
and Methodology in Policy Studies”, Journal of European Public Policy, 21:3,
(2014), pp. 453-469; Matt Wilder, “Ideas beyond Paradigms: Relative
Commensurability and the Case of Canadian Trade-Industrial Policy, 1975-
95,” Journal of European Public Policy, 22: 7(2015), pp. 1004-1021.
8 Erving Goffman, “Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience”
(Havard University Press 1974).
9 Frank Baumgartner, “Ideas, Paradigms and Confusion”, in Journal of European
Public Policy (2014) 21:3, pp. 475-480.
10 Peter Hall, “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State: The Case of Economic
Policy Making in Britain in Comparative Politics” (1995) 25, 3, pp. 275-96.
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that inhibits anything but marginal changes to programme ideas and
policy contents.11 What constitutes policy change and how it occurs,
therefore, remains central to its analysis.
Occasionally, the staying power of ideas encapsulated in paradigms
breaks down as a result of replacement of one identifiable coherent set
of ideas with another.12 Paradigm shifts are complex and dynamic
processes. John Kingdon, a towering scholar of public policy, emphasizes
the time dimension of policy change, arguing that some ideas become
fashionable at specific points in time and context as ideas whose time
has come.13 The unpredictable nature of ideational change has also
preoccupied scholars. Policy change, according to Albert Hirschman,
“occurs as a result of surprise, otherwise it would be suppressed by
forces that are in favour of the status quo”.14 Continuity is therefore
not given but wilfully maintained.15
Random and perceived disruptive events are important drivers of
paradigm shifts. The role of exogenously induced shocks in policy change
has long been widely studied.16 The link between crises and reforms is
very strong in economic literature.17 The disruptive event is defined as
11 Paul, Sabatier, “An  Advocacy  Coalition  Framework  of  Policy  Change  and  the
Role  of  Policy-Oriented Learning in Policy Sciences” (1988), 21, 2: 3, 129-68.
12 Mathew Wood. 2015.  “Puzzling and  Powering  in  Policy  Paradigm  Shifts:
Politicization, Depoliticization and Social Learning in Critical Policy Studies”
(2015), 9:1, pp. 2-21, p. 10.
13 John Kingdon, “Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies” (University  of
Michigan 1984),  p. 3.
14 Albert Hirschman, “Propensity to Self-Subversion” (Harvard University Press
1995), p. 10.
15 David Dery, “Agenda Setting and Problem Definition”, Policy Studies, Vol. 21, No.
1 (2000).
16 Giandomenico Majone. 1989. “Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion in the Policy
Process” (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1989); Thomas Birkland  (1997).
“After Disaster: Agenda Setting, Public Policy and Focusing Events” (George
Washington University Press, Washington, 1997); Mark Blyth, “Great
Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth
Century” (Cambridge University Press, 2002); John Hogan & Sharon Feeney,
(2012). “Crisis and Policy Change: The Political Entrepreneur”. Risks, Hazards
and Crisis in Public Policy, Volume 3, Issue 2, Article 6 (2012).
17 Aaron Tornell, “Economic Crises and Reforms in Mexico”. In Vitrolio Corbo,
Latin American Macroeconomic Reform (Chicago University Press, 2003) pp.
127-150; Romain Rancière & Aaron Tornell, Why do Reforms Occur in Crisis
Times (IMF Working Paper, 2015).
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18 Michel Gorges, “The New Institutionalism and the Study of the European: The
Case of the Social Dialogue”. West European Politics, 24(4), (2001), pp. 152-
168, p. 155.
19 Christophe Coyne, “Constitutions and Crisis”.  Journal of Economic and
Behavioral Organization (2011), pp. 351-357.
20 Peter Grossman, “Energy Shocks, Crises and the Policy Process: A Review of
Theory and Application”, Energy Policy, Vol. 77, pp. 56-69 (2015).
21 Vivien Schmidt,  “Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas
and Discourse”, The Annual Review of Political Science, 11 (2008), pp. 303-26.
22 John Kingdon, “Agendas,  Alternatives  and  Public  Policies” (University  of
Michigan 1984),  p. 3.
23 Ibid.
24 Arjen Boin (2009). “The New World of Crises and Crises Management:
Implications for Policy Making and Research”, Review of Policy Research, 26(4),
(2009), pp. 367-377.
25 OrtwinRenn, Andreas Klinke & Marjolein Van Asselt , “Coping with Complexity,
Uncertainty and Ambiguity in Risk Governance: A Synthesis”, Ambio, 40(2),
(2011), pp. 231-246.
a critical juncture during which major change is possible.18 From a
systemic perspective, Coyne defines crisis as unexpected event that
creates uncertainty and poses a direct or perceived threat to the goals
and norms of an organization, institutions and society.19 Crises do not
occur in a vacuum on their own; they are often precipitated by some
events or shocks to the system.20 Notably, the definition of crisis as
externally induced events remains limited and too deterministic. It
discounts the role of endogenous factors.
Open windows of opportunity remain crucial to turn ideas into
policy change. Ideas do not only remain floating and waiting for crisis-
windows to open, they in themselves can also create opportunities for
change.21 Kingdon identifies the existence of at least four possible
windows: routinized political windows, discretionary windows,
spillover windows and random problem windows.22 Along a continuum
of institutionalization and predictability, crises-driven events as
exogenous shocks occupy one end of the predictability spectrum.23 The
nature of crises has changed over the last decade, becoming more and
more transboundary in reach, crossing sectors, regions and countries.24
Crises have become more systemic, marked by a high degree of
complexity, uncertainty, ambiguity as well as urgency.25
Yet not all policy change is the same. Based on instruments and
goals, Peter Hall examines the scale of ideational change and organized
them into three levels: first order change which are routine adjustments
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26 Peter Hall, “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State: The Case of Economic
Policy Making in Britain”, Comparative Politics, 25, 3 (1993), pp. 275-96.
27 Micheal Howlett & M. Ramesh, Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy
Subsystems, Second Edition (Oxford University Press Canada, 2003).
28 Stephen Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables”, International Organization, 36/2 Spring (1982), pp.
185-205; Robert Stocker,  “A Regime Framework for Implementation Analysis”,
Policy Studies Review, 9, 1 (1989); Lee Preston, & Duane Windsor, The Rules of
the Game in the Global Economy: Policy Regimes for International Business (Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1992).
29 Micheal Howlett & M. Ramesh, Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy
Subsystems, Scond Edition. Oxford University Press Canada, 2003).
30 Daniel Beland, Martin Carstensen & Leonard Seabrooke, “Ideas, Political Power
and Public Policy”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 23, Issue 3 (2016), pp.
315-317.
to existing policies; Second order changes in the policy instruments
used to achieve shared goals; and third order changes in the hierarchy
of goals themselves.26 The first two orders of change tinker around
policy mechanisms while the last involves substantive changes in
policies, including normative claims.
Meanwhile, ideas on their own rarely transform themselves into
policy change. They operate in a context, underpinned by agency. Recent
studies in public policy continue to emphasize the role of agency
through long-term patterns of policy processes as well as policy
paradigms. In fact, policy style and policy content combine to form
policy regime.27 Policy regimes have been used in different ways including
political, international and implementation regimes.28 Irrespective of
the meaning and confusion, the term regime addresses some core
criticisms against the use of ideas as the overarching variable in policy
change, by underlying the role of actors, institutions and interests.29
Policy regime, therefore, provides an analytical concept for capturing
long-term patterns of processes and policy content.
The first generation of ideational scholarship eloquently underscores
the role and mechanism in which ideas matter. The literature collectively
provides an interpretive framework through which ideas give meaning
to value, preferences that make political and economic interest
actionable.30 Observably, how ideas in themselves can generate power
to bring about policy change, evolution or stagnation is often assumed
than explained. Some scholars argue that the possession and
promulgation of ideas that serve to define a given moment of crisis
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31 Mark Blyth, “Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change
in the Twentieth Century” (Cambridge University Press, 2002) p. 4; Robert
Cox, “The Social Construction of an Imperative: Why Welfare Reforms
Happened in Denmark and the Netherlands but Not in Germany”, World Politics
55(3) (2001), pp. 463-498.
32 Max Weber. 1968. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology
(Bedminister Press, New York, 1968).
33 Robert Dahl, “The Concept of Power”, Behavioral Science, 2(3) (1957), pp. 201-
215.
34 Michel Foucault. 1978. “The History of Sexuality, translated by Robert Hurley,’’
Vol 1 (Pantheon New York 1978), p. 93.
35 Martin Carstensen & Vivien Schmidt, “Power through, over and in Ideas:
Conceptualizing Ideational Power in Discursive Institutionalism”, Journal of
European Public Policy, Vol. 23, Issue 3 (2016).
36 Ibid, p. 319.
37 Micheal Howlett & M. Ramesh, Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy
Subsystems, Second Edition (Oxford University Press Canada, 2003).
38 Michel Barnett & Duvall Raymond, “Power in International Politics”,
International Organization, 59 (4), (2005), pp. 39-75.
and project the institutional forms that will resolve it becomes a crucial
power resource.31
Power, in general, is a relational and multidimensional concept.
Traditionally, power in the social sciences has been framed as the ability
to achieve one’s aim amidst resistance.32 This however, goes beyond
material resources. It involves symbolic and normative resources in
addition to structures and institutions.33 Foucault conceptualizes the
relationship between power and ideas and how they are used as a
form of social control. According to him, power is socially constructed
– the omnipresence of power is not based on its privileging a particular
position in relation to others, but that it is produced from one moment
to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point
to another.34
Recent scholarship has examined ideational power as an
independent analytical concept in its own right, similar with other
forms of power.35 Ideational power is “the capacity of actors (whether
individual or collective) to influence actors’ normative and cognitive
beliefs through the use of ideational elements.”36 The literature therefore
conceptualizes ideational power in a much more specific and dynamic
way than the more generic claim in the public policy literature that
ideas matter on their own.37 Ideational power therefore should produce
particular kinds of effects through unleashing agency on an agency-
oriented approach.38 Carstensen and Schmidt theorizes ideas and power
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39 Martin Carstensen & Vivien Schmidt, “Power through, over and in Ideas:
Conceptualizing Ideational Power in Discursive Institutionalism”, Journal of
European Public Policy, Vol. 23, Issue 3 (2016).
40 Martin Carstensen and Vivien Schmidt, “Power through, over and in Ideas:
Conceptualizing Ideational Power in Discursive Institutionalism”, Journal of
European Public Policy, Vol. 23, Issue 3 (2016).
41 David Howard. 2009. “Power, Discourse, and Policy: Articulating a Hegemony
Approach to Critical Policy Studies”, Critical Policy Studies, Vol. 3 (3-4), (2009)
pp. 309-355.
42 Collin Hay & Rosamond Ben, “Globalization, European Integration and the
Discursive Construction of Economic Imperatives”, Journal of European Public
Policy, Vol. 9 (2), (2002), pp.147-167.
43 Micheal Howlett and M. Ramesh, Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy
Subsystems, second edition. Oxford University Press Canada, 2003.
44 Maarten Hajer, “Discourse Coalitions and the Institutionalization of Practice:
The Case of Acid Rain In Britain”, Forester, Fischer and Forester (1993), pp. 43-
47.
in three dimensions.39 First, power through ideas, which is the capacity
of actors to persuade other actors to accept and adopt their views of
what to think and do through the use of ideational elements. Second,
power over ideas, which is the imposition of ideas by agents and the
power of actors to resist the inclusion of alternative ideas into the
policy making process. Third, power in ideas, which is exercised through
the use of structures and institutions to establish a hegemony over the
production of ideas or constraining what ideas may be considered in
the policy-making process and implementation.40 Actors interpret their
world through a range of ideational elements including practices,
symbols, frames, norms and discourses.41
In practice, the influence of ideational power in policy-making is
complex. It can be exercised in a top-down or in bottom-up fashion
taking into consideration struggles by actors at the top of the policy
making hierarchy as well as those at the bottom through implementa-
tion of policies.42 The mechanisms of transmission of policy ideas have
profound influence on actors, institutions, and instruments. Ideas may
continue to remain reluctant to change over extended periods of time,
shaping sectoral policies with consistent content as well as establishing
and consolidating new and old processes.43 Hajer underscores role and
structure of knowledge-communities in policy formulation. Discourse
communities share some common level of understanding of a problem,
its definition and its causes, including disagreements.44 These knowledge
networks have also been conceptualized as epistemic communities.
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45 Peter Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination”, International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1 (1992), p. 4, pp. 1-36.
46 Paul Schulman, “Non-Incremental Policy Making: Notes toward an Alternative”,
American Political Science Review, 69 (1975), pp. 1354-1370.
47 MichealHowlett & M. Ramesh, Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy
Subsystems, Second Edition (Oxford University Press Canada, 2003).
48 Chris Robert, “The Other Resource Curse: Extractives as Development Panacea”,
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 2 (2015), pp. 283-307.
49 Hany Besada & Philip Martin, “Mining Codes in Africa: Emergence of a ‘Fourth’
Generation?” Cambridge Journal of International Affairs, 28: 2 (2015), pp.
263-282.
50 Bonnie Campbell, Mining in Africa: Regulation and Development (Pluto Press,
New York, 2009).
51 Bonnie Campbell, “Revisiting the Reform Process of African Mining Regimes”,
Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue canadienne d’études du
développement, 30:1-2, (2010), pp. 197-217.
Haas defines epistemic community as “a network of professionals with
recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain
or issue-area”.45 Schulman provides a typology of ideas organized within
communities, based on whether there is a consensus or not.46 Howlett
and Ramesh have developed a matrix with four different dimensions:
hegemonic, contested, fractious and chaotic communities.47 For
example, a fractious community likely occurs where one idea is
dominant but faces challenges from less popular but equally compelling
set of ideas.
The policy-making process in the extractive sector in general mirrors
a fractious discourse community. Extractive-led development
frameworks in Africa continue to experience increasing patterns of
contestations, stability and flux. There is extensive scholarship on varied
mining regimes operating within the continent. In fact, the idea that
natural resource inheritances should fuel faster and more equitable
economic growth is hardly new.48 Reform efforts are at the centre of
wider policy debates over the role of natural resource governance and
economic development in the continent.49 Most scholars point at
external influences – diffusion of western norms, rules, procedures as
well as leverage of transnational actors on policy design and
implementation in the minerals sector.50 As a deep core idea, reform
efforts are underpinned by “free-mining”, an ideology that guided the
formulation of mining regimes in North America and Britain during the
19th century.51
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52 Bonnie Campbell, Regulating Mining in Africa: For Whose Benefit, Discussion
Paper 26 (Upsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2004).
53 Hany Besada & Philip Martin, “Mining Codes in Africa: Emergence of a ‘Fourth’
Generation?” Cambridge Journal of International Affairs, 28:2 (2015), pp. 263-
282.
54 World Bank, Strategy for African Mining, World Bank Technical Paper No. 181
(Washington, 1992).
55 Bonnie Campbell, Regulating Mining in Africa: For Whose Benefit, Discussion
Paper 26 (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2004).
56 Bonnie Campbell, Regulating Mining in Africa: For Whose Benefit,’ Discussion
Paper 26 (Upsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2004).
The doctrine prioritizes mining rights over all other development
uses of land, and bestows preferential treatment to mining companies
over all other actors.52 Free mining laid down the ideological foundation
for a package of neoliberal structural reforms that were conditioned on
African countries for accessing development financing from international
financial institutions, in particular the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). The most significant reforms took place
immediately after the oil crisis of the 1980s, preceding a post-colonial
era where many African countries adopted a nationalistic state-led
approach in developing their mining sector.53 Through its influential
strategy for mining in Africa adopted in 1992, the World Bank
mainstreamed free-market, private sector led approach to mining across
the continent.54 The strategy framed the central challenge to Africa’s
mining sector as a supply-side problem – the lack of investment, which
indebted mineral-rich countries were unable to provide in a sustainable
manner for the development of the sector. Consequently, the report
stated that future development of the industry in Africa would depend
on attracting new high-risk capital from foreign mining companies.
Since then, mining reforms have evolved, albeit incrementally in
the region. Taking the state as its focus, Campbell identifies three
successive generations of liberalization reforms in the extractive sector
in Africa.55 The first generation, illustrated by Ghana took place in the
1980s and was underpinned by the stringent withdrawal of the state
from the sector to attract private investors. The second generation,
exemplified by Guinea, took place in mid-1990s and was underpinned
by the limited application of state authority, in specific areas like the
protection of the environment. The third generation reflected the
recognition that the state has a role to play in areas of regulation but
limited to facilitation and secondary to the “ownership and operator”
role of the mining companies.56
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Generation?” Cambridge Journal of International Affairs, 28: 2 (2015), pp.
263-282.
58 Ibid.
59 Martin Carstensen and Vivien Schmidt, “Power through, over and in Ideas:
Conceptualizing Ideational Power in Discursive Institutionalism”, Journal of
European Public Policy, Vol. 23, Issue 3 (2016), p. 362.
Subsequent studies have built on the generation-based typology.
Based on their procedural focus, Besada and Martin have qualified a
new wave of private and transnational regimes focusing on governance
as an emerging fourth generation of policy regimes in the mining
sector.57 African countries remain central to the emerging governance
innovations, including corporate social responsibility, Kimberly Process
Certification Scheme (KPCS), Publish What You Pay (PWYP) and the
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), and the US Dodd
Frank law. Added to the mixture of externally driven regimes, Besada
and Martin (2015) lumped them together with African owned
frameworks.58 The paper however noted that the AMV adopted in 2009,
by African Heads of States is the most important continental initiative
on mining.
The generation-based typology, as captured in the above studies,
reveals a fundamental methodological and substantive weakness. It is
non-hierarchical in the way it frames policy change as such fails to
distinguish between, change that is substantive and that which is
merely procedural. The time-series typology assumes rather than
explains the ideational foundation of change through the power in
ideas.59 In fact, it is the deeper level of ideas that frames the policy
options including instruments that are normatively possible.
Consequently, the generation-based typology erroneously lumps
different degrees of change, including core normative ideas and
implementation mechanisms together. The studies are, therefore,
limited in capturing finer elements and time-relevant dimensions of
ideas and how they have shaped mineral regimes in Africa. For example,
besides the aforementioned first generation of regimes, there have been
no apparent marked changes in the deep core ideas of the subsequent
generations of regimes identified, until the adoption of the AMV. All
the precedent generations of regimes are founded on a deep-seated
idea of primarily capturing rents from minerals resources before building
the necessary linkages and diversification for the broad-based
2017 THE AFRICAN MINING VISION 157
60 Economic Commission for Africa, Minerals and Africa’s Development: The
International Study Group Report (Addis Ababa, 2011).
61 Peter Hall, “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State: The Case of Economic
Policy Making in Britain”, Comparative Politics, 25, 3 (1993), pp. 275-96.
62 Hany Besada & Philip Martin, “Mining Codes in Africa: Emergence of a ‘Fourth’
Generation?”, Cambridge Journal of International Affairs, 28:2 (2015), pp. 263-
282; Timothy Shaw (2015). “Public Diplomacy for Developmental States:
Implementing the African Mining Vision”. In George Kararach, Hany
Besada, Timothy  Shaw (eds), Development in Africa: Refocusing the Lens after
the Millennium Development Goals (Policy Press, Bristol, 2015).
63 Economic Commission for Africa, Minerals and Africa’s Development: The
International Study Group Report (Addis Ababa, 2011); William Brown, “A
Question of Agency: Africa in International Politics”, Third World Quaterly, Vol.
33, No. 10 (2012), pp. 1899-908; William Brown and Sophie Harman,  African
Agency and International Relations (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013).
64 Chris Robert, “The Other Resource Curse: Extractives as Development Panacea”.
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 2 (2015), pp. 283-307.
development of the sector.60 The neoliberal and free-mining doctrine
continues to be an enduring idea across different generations of regimes.
The change therefore underscored by the second, third and fourth
generation of regimes is limited to mechanisms and instruments rather
than substance of ideas, consistent with the Peter Hall’sfirst and second
order change mentioned above.61
The appropriation of AMV in Africa by businesses and civil society
organizations remains work in progress. A general critique is its focus
on resurrecting the developmental state62 – greater state involvement,
activist industrial policy-making, and resource nationalism. There remain
concerns about the ability of Africa to leverage its regional governance
regimes in ways that transform the continent from norm-taker to norm-
setter.63 Leveraging the transformative potential of Africa’s abundant
minerals resources as encapsulated in the AMV has recently been
labelled another resource curse.64 The proposition is that, geological
endowment alone is not panacea for economic development,
industrialization and poverty alleviation. He underscores perceived
contradictions inherent in the AMV and the unintended, unpredictable
and unwelcome consequences of misreading the complex nature of
the extractive industry in Africa. However, despite implementation
challenges, Robert’s conclusion that AMV remains fixated on maximizing
minerals endowment of the continent is inaccurate.
The AMV, in fact, is a dynamic and multidimensional framework,
with an ideational foundation based on optimizing the value of Africa’s
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Failures in Natural Resource Extraction (Palgrave, New York, 2011).
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rich-mineral resources for broad-based development rather than
maximizing rents accruing from their exploitation (Akong,
forthcoming). The continental owned strategy extends beyond
capitalizing on Africa’s comparative advantage. It aims to create
internationally competitive mining economies in the continent, through
integrating markets for mineral products from the local, national and
regional levels – catalysing the emergence of viable regional value chains
as well as inserting economies into the higher rungs of global minerals
value chains.
The emergence of the AMV is set against outcomes of neoliberal
reforms, which so far remain mixed and widely debated.65 While
successful in attracting increased foreign investment, natural resource
exploitation in Africa has been labelled a curse.66 African governments,
communities and citizens have questioned the development benefits
of mining reforms.67 Neoliberal regulations in the sector are blamed for
maximizing benefits for privately owned companies and few elites,
excluding a large majority of the population from the sharing of benefits
of their mineral wealth.68 The externally driven reforms are perceived
as lacking legitimacy and democratic accountability.69
The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
argues that the pressure of aligning macroeconomic objectives with
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the demands of attracting foreign investment encourages governments
to insulate economic decisions and policy-making from democratic
scrutiny.70 The lack of capacity of African states to monitor and enforce
natural resource governance in addition to the growing expectation
and reality-gap of mining-based development has prompted calls for
stronger natural resource strategies.71 The unequal relationships
between African countries and large multinational and powerful
financial institutions that resulted from the reforms have also been
cited as a failed outcome. Citing a World Bank report, one recent study
observes that “every country that borrowed from the Bank did worse
the more it depended on extractive resource”.72 A review of the impact
of the World Bank-supported reforms concludes that the neo-liberal
ideology is inconsistent with building a set of strong institutions to
drive structural transformation in African economies.73
The birth of the AMV in 2009 also coincided with the emergence
of varieties of capitalism in development thinking.74 In addition to the
traditional models of capitalism, Nölke and Vliegenthart conceptualize
another variant of capitalism – the state-permeated market economies
–as typical for large emerging economies.75 They argue that the countries
practising this new form of capitalism are deeply enmeshed in the
international trading system and global production networks. Owing
to the large size of their domestic markets, governments of emerging
economies have a good negotiation position towards foreign investors
and governments and are able to practise a selective opening of the
economy.
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The rise of several of these large emerging economies, collectively
labelled as the BRICS, and enhanced by the 2008 global financial crisis
arguably ranks among the most important contemporary structural
changes in the global political economy. The emergence of BRICS was
believed to open up the policy space for new thinking about alternative
forms of capitalism, which are more adaptable to a country’s own
realities – combining state-led and market interventions.76 In addition,
China’s insatiable demand for commodities was believed to stay long
enough in to continuously lead to rising prices for Africa’s minerals.77
African agency was underscored as a determined response by the
continent’s developmental states to the gains rather than costs of the
discovery of Africa’s potential by the BRICS, especially China.78
The outcomes of substantive and enduring reforms of the extractive
sector in Africa remain an open question. The disillusionment over the
Washington consensus of neoliberal reforms has yet to yield alternative
policy frameworks even within the context of post-Washington
consensus, where finding the right balance between state and markets
is increasingly recognized. Resistance to change has been linked to
national and international structures of power that favour corporations
as well as national elites that align behind them.79 Ideas and discourses
are just a part of the elements behind policy change. Actors often act
without having ideas about what they are doing, let alone talking about
it, until after they actually do it.80
Policy change is therefore dynamic, complex and a complicated
process with ideas playing an important role. The mode of ideational
change in the extractive industry may take several forms: multiple
streams, advocacy coalition, policy diffusion and punctuated
76 The rise of state capitalism, in The Economist, 21 January 2012.
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equilibrium.81 According to the multiple streams theory, advocates and
experts in the policy stream have ideas about policies and monitor the
problem stream for a condition amiable to their solution in what has
been labelled “problem surfing”.82 The advocacy coalition framework
focuses on learning and policy change within a policy subsystem, taking
into consideration both internal and external shocks to the subsystem.83
Policy diffusion tracks how similar policy innovations are adopted across
countries and sectors.84 Originally introduced by Baumgartner and
Jones, the punctuated equilibrium focuses on two facets of policy-
making, long periods of stability and periods of long-term change.85
All theories have their own weaknesses and room always exists for
improvement and better policy application. Therefore, any attempts
to find one simple causal policy mechanism for change applicable to
every country, sector, context and minerals will invariably fail in
contributing to informed decision-making.In examining motivations
behind policy interventions, Stevens et al argue that the focus of
prevailing policy ideas on better management is based on a patently
wrong assumption that the same type of sector management is suitable
for every country and mineral.86
There appears to be evolution in the literature of the resource curse
thesis. Increasingly the criticisms of natural resource led development,
is shifting from the classic resource curse, amenable to one-size-fits-all
policy interventions to a softer but sophisticated critique of the
ideational foundation of development prescriptions. This affirms why
Africa’s place, at the centre of transnational governance innovations in
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the extractive sector remains a source of renewed optimism.87 Future
work on how Africa’s ideas effectively create agency will provide better
policy guidance for positioning the continent in the global economy.
In fact, as Brown underscores: Africa should be viewed as actor, not
just acted upon, and historical agent not just history’s recipient.88
3.  THE AFRICA MINING VISION
The AMV is as old as mining and development in post-independent
Africa. The motivations behind the Vision remain diverse, including
economic, social and political. Central to the AMV is the recurrent
challenge of structural transformation of economies.89 Decades of
mineral exploitation in various countries, is yet to translate into lasting
development outcomes.90 Even after several reforms in the sector,
mostly driven by external institutions, the paradox of plenty affects
policy interventions in the sectorsuch that vast mineral exploitation
projects continue in enclave manner, side by side with extreme poverty.
For example, Antonio has underscored coordination gaps, which have
limited mining investment from leveraging linkages with transformative
impacts on other critical sectors.91
The insular and failed policies reflect a much deeper set of complex
challenges of the mining industry in Africa. Shaped by historical and
political economy factors, the deficiencies remain a central feature and
binding constraint to transform the sector. Largely a colonial creation,
African countries continue to occupy a marginal position, at the lowest
rung of the global value chain. African countries are yet to take full
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advantage of their abundant mineral endowment to drive their
industrialization and structural transformation of economies.92 African
economies remain primary suppliers of key minerals to drive
industrialization for other economies, outside the continent.
The priorities of the AMV are therefore a product of longstanding
aspirations of African governments to chart an alternative development
path that is owned by countries. The framework builds on previous
policies and processes at the continental level. For examples, the 1979
Monrovia Declaration committed African countries to achieve self-
reliance through cooperation in areas of natural resources management
including extraction. The Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic
Development of Africa adopted in 1980 by the Organization of African
Unity (now AU) provided concrete actions to the Declaration. The
Plan proposed an alternative narrative to the structural adjustment
programmes imposed by the Bretton Wood institutions as well as
highlighted the vulnerability of African economies to worldwide
economic shocks including the oil price shocks of 1973.
The changing business society relations over the last decade have
influenced the design of the AMV. The increased scrutiny of the activities
of transnational companies has further raised the negative profile of
the industry in Africa and the need for more forward looking
approaches. The strengthening of globalization during the 1990s came
with the growth of new modes of governance, which are more voluntary
and inclusive.
The timing of AMV coincided with the spectacular emergence of
China as an economic power of global reach, creating space unlike
before for African alternative development approaches. China’s outsize
influence as the world’s greatest consumer of metals, introduced a
strong element of competition as well as expectations of sustained
demand and high prices for Africa’s commodities. The China-led
supercycle of upward rising commodity prices, strengthens the
bargaining power of African countries as owners of highly demanded
commodities over mining companies. During the period of the boom,
African countries seized the leadership opportunity presented to
organize stakeholders for lasting solutions towards improving
governance for the sector. The African Union (AU), Africa Development
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Bank (AfDB), and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
(UNECA) adopted a number of declarations and resolutions which led
to the organization of the “Big Table”, a multistakeholder forum held
in 2007, followed by the first conference of the AU Ministers of Mines
held in 2008.
An International Study Group (ISG) established by UNECA and
the AUC in 2007 brought together globally renowned experts from
private, public and civil society sectors. The ISG reviewed Africa’s mining
regimes and produced a comprehensive report that laid the foundation
for the AMV. The ISG report asserted that the structural transformation
of African economies is “an essential component of any long term
strategy to ensure the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) …, eradicate poverty and underpin sustainable growth and
development”, and that this requires “a strategy … rooted in the
utilization of Africa’s significant resource assets.93
The AMV responds to the ISG report as it embodies a set of core
ideas, principles and instruments for structural transformation in Africa’s
mining sector. Adopted by African Heads of States in 2009, the Vision
marks, for the first time, the articulation of Africa’s agency and resolve
to shift from norm-taker to norm-setter. It represents a paradigm shift,
away from the entrenched focus on maximizing revenues from export
of commodities in their raw forms, towards harnessing mineral
resources for broad-based development. As a visible collective
expression of developmental state ambition by Africa, the vision calls
on member states to align their minerals policies strongly with
industrial, trade and science, as well as their technology and innovation
policies.
The continental framework seeks to create a “transparent, equitable
and optimal exploitation of Africa’s mineral resources to underpin
broad-based sustainable growth and socio-economic development”.94
The strategy attempts not only to address the sector’s isolation from
mainstream social and economic activities but also create win-win
outcomes for all stakeholders. The Vision’s key tenets are to integrate
the economic, social and environmental pillars of sustainable
development, including optimizing knowledge and benefits of finite
93 Economic Commission for Africa, Minerals and Africa’s Development: The
International Study Group Report on Africa’s Minerals Regime, (Addis Ababa,
2011), p. 2.
94 African Union, The Africa Mining Vision (Addis Ababa, 2009), p. 1.
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mineral resources at all levels of mining and for all minerals; harnessing
the potential of small scale mining to improve livelihoods and
integration into the rural and national economy; fostering sustainable
development principles based on environmentally and socially
responsible mining, which is safe and includes communities and all
other stakeholders; building human and institutional capacities towards
a knowledge economy that supports innovation, research and
development; developing a diversified and globally competitive African
mineral industry which contributes to broad economic and social
growth through the creation of economic linkages; fostering a
transparent and accountable mineral sector in which resource rents
are optimized and used to promote broad economic and social
development; and promoting good governance of the mineral sector
in which communities and citizens participate in mineral assets and in
which there is equity in the distribution of benefits.95
The main instruments of the AMV include its Action Plan adopted
in 2011 as well as its guidebook for undertaking the Country Mining
Vision (CMV) adopted in 2014. The action plan comprises nine
programme clusters of activities constructed around the key tenets.
The CMV operations manual developed by the African Minerals
Development Centre (AMDC) provides a practical step-by step guide,
setting out how countries can apply the AMV in their own context.
The CMV facilitates the articulation of a vision, including the emergence
of a new social contract for the sector that extends beyond political
and commodity cycles. The CMV remains the main tool used by AMDC
and its implementing partners to support countries.
As a bold vision, the AMV aims to focus discussions on the role of
minerals in African countries development. The CMV therefore provides
an institutional process for a not-business-as-usual approach –
broadening the dialogue with stakeholders from the traditional entry
point of Ministry of Mines to include Ministry of Industry, Trade,
Education and Research as well as private sector and civil society actors.
The CMV creates a policy space for the kind of conversation that goes
beyond optimizing revenue potentials of mining through the usual
recipe of measures such as improvements of legal and regulatory
frameworks, tweaking the mineral fiscal regime or offering investors a
95 African Union, The Africa Mining Vision (Addis Ababa, 2009), p. 1.
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predictable and stable business environment. It opens space for far
deeper and fundamental structural shift, which calls for a new
dispensation and paradigm change.96
The AMV regime includes the Vision, its Action Plan, CMV its
domesticating tool, and its institutional partners including the Africa
Union Member States, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), African
Union Commission, African Development Bank, United Nations
Economic Commission for Africa, and the Africa Minerals Development
Centre.
4.  TOWARDS A DYNAMIC CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK
To frame policy change in the extractive sector in Africa, we adapt
John Kingdon’s multivariate and crisis-driven model of agenda setting.97
Three key variables interact to turn ideas into policy change: problems,
policy and politics streams (see Figure 1). The choice of the framework
96 Pedro Antonio, “The Country Mining Vision: Towards a New Deal”, Mineral
Economics (2015), pp. 1-8








Figure 1. An Innovative Dynamic Framework for Conceptualizing the AMV
Paradigm Shift
2017 THE AFRICAN MINING VISION 167
is useful because it can be extended to include all stages of policy
process, including policy implementation. A growing number of studies
are adapting the framework beyond agenda setting.98  In fact, Ness and
Mistretta (2009) notes that entrepreneurs actively seek to merge
streams in order to ensure that their preferred policy design is
implemented.99
Adapting the multiple stream framework, we examine volatility as
the key problem facing extractive-led development agenda.
Industrialization is analysed as sustainable policy option to manage
volatility as well as catalyse broad-based transformation of the
structures of mineral rich economies. The political stream consists of
factors such as contextual changes including institutions, interests and
actors realignment.
According to Kingdon (1984), the three streams operate separately
and pursue different paths, which may be less overlapping, until specific
points in time or policy windows where their paths can interact
mutually.100 Policy windows could be seized to establish an already
existing paradigm or bring about a paradigm shift. Kingdon further
attributed windows opening to two sources: political and problem
streams.
The proposed framework is an innovation to the multiple stream
concept by integrating key elements of political economy into a
crosscutting stream. The political economy triangle extends the multiple
stream framework to capture the dimensions of interests constellations
and their interactions with the power frames of the ideas. It acts like
prism filtering the ideas in the politics, problem and policy streams in
ways that may resist or catalyse change. Basically it involves the mutual
political and economic relations, which shape the behaviour of actors,
institutions, sector and society.101 It includes a triangle of incentives of
ruling elites, bureaucrats and business elites to work towards the
98 Mathew Nowlin, “Theories of the Policy Process: State of the Research and
Emerging Trends”, The Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 39, No. S1 (2011), pp. 41-
60.
99 Eric Ness and Molly Mistretta, “Policy Adoption in North Carolina and
Tennessee: A Comparative Case Study of Lottery Beneficiaries”, The Review of
Higher Education, Vol. 32, No. 4 (2009), pp. 489-514.
100 John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (University of Michigan,
1984).
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(Governance Social Development Humanitarian Conflict, 2013).
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implementation of the AMV principle of a transparent, equitable and
optimal exploitation of mineral resources to underpin broad-based
sustainable growth and socio-economic development. It also takes into
consideration the dynamics within local communities in mineral rich
countries.
Meanwhile, from a geometric perspective, we further incorporate
multidimensional concepts of time, space and power to capture the
full transformative potentials of all minerals. The dimensions are based
on a typology of the ideas underpinning mining and development policy,
which could be organized into temporal, spatial and capability
theories.102 Time captures volatility, which reflects cyclical movement
in prices in the commodity markets. Space reflects industrialization,
which captures the spatial nature of commodity-led development
strategies. The space dimension captures opportunities for value
addition, linkages and diversification. It examines the potentials of
upgrading within regional and global value chains. Power captures
political opportunities for collective actions, including regional
integration, global dynamics and emerging development priorities.
The advantage of the crisis-driven model is that it effectively
incorporates key institutional factors such as public mood, which
Kingdon (1984) labelled as essential randomness.103 By capturing the
dimension of interests, the framework systematically analyses the
dynamics of extractive-led development in Africa including the
distribution and contestation of power at the top and bottom of the
hierarchy of policy making and implementation. The addition of the
interest networks further corrects for the determinism inherent in the
multiple streams model, which assumes policy change to be
straightforward and automatic, when windows of opportunities open.104
We affirm that the dimension of the entrenched role of actors
provides a robust model for analysing the potential of the AMV in
transforming minerals sector governance in Africa. This approach is
consistent with contemporary policy scholarship, which explains
paradigmatic change in terms of dynamics within epistemic
102 Charles Akong, Framing Matters: A Transformative Taxonomy for Africa’s
Minerals (forthcoming).
103 John Kingdon, Agendas,  Alternatives  and  Public  Policies (University  of Michigan
1984).
104 Ibid.
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communities and interest networks.105 Policy change therefore is a
configuration of outcomes ranging from slow incremental to rapid
paradigmatic policy change.106
5.  AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME?
This section adopts the adapted multiple streams and interests-based
models presented above, to explore the challenges and opportunities
for establishing AMV as an enduring paradigm shift. The analysis will
examine the AMV along the problem stream, policy stream and politics
stream. It also captures the dimension of political economy to account
for vested interests in the way of implementation.
5.1 Problem Stream
Sharp and continuous decline in commodity prices started in 2012
and persists. The situation is complex, uncertain and ambiguous.
Commodities have significantly fallen across the board albeit at varying
degrees. Commodity price indexes have all fallen with the World Bank
Metal Price Index ending 2015 at 50 per cent lower than its 2011
highs (World Bank, 2015). Price formation and movements determined
both by market fundamentals as well as non-market forces including
political risks remain difficult to predict.
The collapsing prices of metals and minerals remain a major problem
to commodity dependent countries. African mineral exporters are price
takers with most of them exporting commodities in their raw forms.
With limited influence on demand side drivers of prices, African
countries have been highly vulnerable to global price movements,
driven largely by dwindling appetite for commodities from China, which
consumes almost 50 per cent of world metals.107 With no sign of any
emerging economy picking up the slack, volatility remains very
105 George Hoberg, “Putting Ideas in their Place: A Response to Learning and
Change in the British Columbia Forest Policy Sector”, Canadian Journal of
Political Science, Vol. 29(1) (1996), pp. 135-144.
106 Michel Howlett and M. Ramesh, Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy
Subsystems, Second edition (Oxford University Press, 2003).
107 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Excessive
Commodity Price Volatility: Macroeconomic Effects on Growth and Policy,
(Geneva, 2012).
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significant and even higher when compared to the last century.108
Rapid price movements and excessive resource-dependency
together have imposed severe macroeconomic pains. Currencies
supported by commodities are under strain, with Zambian Kwacha
weakening rapidly following significant slide in copper prices as well
as Angola, which devalued its Kwaza twice in 2015 by a total of 22 per
cent.109 According to one estimate, Africa oil exporting countries are
losing over US$63 billion for every 30 per cent decline in oil prices.110
The Nigerian government has taken measures to restrict growing import
bill in order to save the country’s dwindling reserves. In fact, Africa’s
growth projection by the IMF remains downbeat: even though finishing
2015 at less than four per cent, the continent continues to perform
above the global average.111
The industry is no stranger to the familiar patterns of painful super-
corrections following super cycles, a once-in-generation period of high
prices that started in the 2000s. Investors have responded with spending
cuts and layoffs by some of the world’s biggest mining companies in
Africa. Drill activity around the world dropped, with Africa’s share of
drilling dropping slightly from 15 per cent in July 2014 to 12 per cent
in 2015.112 Broken down, the drill results announced for base metals
dropped far much than those of precious metals, with six per cent in
2015 against 14 per cent in 2014 and for gold we have from 19 per
cent in July 2014 to 15 per cent in July 2015. For the first time since
2009, the market value of the global mining industry dropped below
US$1 trillion, compared to 2.5 trillion just over four years ago.113
The current crisis reveals structural weakness of the revenue-first
model, which centres on maximizing collection of resource rents for
investment in development activities after. In defending the rent
108 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Excessive
Commodity Price Volatility: Macroeconomic Effects on Growth and Policy
(Geneva, 2012).
109 African Business, “What is the Impact of Low Oil Prices on African Economies?”,
12 November 2015.
110 Zhenbo Hou, Jodie Keane, Jane Kennan and Dirk Willemte Velde, The Oil Price
Shock of 2014: Drivers, Impacts and Policy Implications (Overseas Development
Institute, London, 2015).
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maximization model, the Natural Resource Governance Institute
(NRGI) recently noted that in “every crisis there is a story of a
government that has planned well in advance” to deal with it.114 Yet
African countries seem to have done relatively well on this score.
Resource rich Africa improved its tax take during the boom period,
with resource rents jumping from 39 per cent in 2000-2003 to 43 per
cent in 2010-2013.115 Tax levels are high with average corporate income
tax rate in Africa, which applies to the mining sector approximating 32
per cent, higher than the world average.116
Nevertheless, this is just one side of much more complex story of
extractive-led development in Africa. More revenue has not meant better
spending and improved outcomes. The ideational foundation of the
neoliberal mining regimes and their improved variants has not been
solid enough to bring about fiscal transformation.117 Its deep core idea,
which disproportionately privileges the interests of mining companies
over that of governments and communities remains ill-adapted to inform
effective policy design and implementation. Its procedural focus on
efficiency and transparency rather than equity and fairness, means
African countries are yet to mobilize optimal value from their mineral
resources.
In 2010, mining companies net an aggregate profit of US$110
billion, an increase of 156 per cent from the previous year.118 Mining
companies’ profits increased at four times the rate of government
revenues between 2000 and 2011, when world gold prices jumped
from US$300 to US$1,600 per ounce.119 As a consequence of the liberal
fiscal policies accompanying privatization, virtually none of the resource
114 Natural Resource Governance Institute, “Why Weren’t Governments Better
Prepared for the Commodity Crash?”, 3 July, 2015, p. 2.
115 African Development Bank, “Regional Development and Spatial Inclusion”,
Africa Economic Outlook (Abidjan, 2015), p. 64.
116 African Development Bank, AfDB, African Economic Report (Tunis, 2010).
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rents accruing from copper mining in Zambia went to the government.
That is, whereas copper mining had contributed an average of 45 per
cent of government’s revenues between 1965 and 1975, it made
virtually no direct contribution to government revenues during the
pre-financial crisis boom of 2002 to 2008.120
Sub-optimal policy instruments further translate into weak adminis-
trative capacity. In fact, African countries have stuck with the low
hanging fruits of taxation – production-based fixed royalties. According
to a survey conducted by the African Development Bank, with the
exception of South Africa, which imposed a profit-based royalty, all
other African countries used ad-valorem royalty as of mid-2011.121
Furthermore, almost all royalty rates in Africa were fixed, with only a
few exceptions. For example, in 2010 Burkina Faso instituted an ad-
valorem royalty rate that was indexed to gold prices. Specifically, the
minimum royalty rate is 3 per cent (ad-valorem), which increases to 4
per cent when gold prices are between USD1,000/ounce and
USD1,300/ounce, and further to 5 per cent when prices go in excess of
USD1, 300/ounce.122 Nonetheless, the average corporate income tax
in Africa, which applies to the mining sector approximates 32 per cent,
but given the lengthy tax exemption period granted to numerous mining
companies, this profit-based tax rarely is a major source of revenue to
most African countries.123
Inadequate attention to fairnessas a foundational idea continues
to create asymmetry of power relations as well as gaps in fiscal regimes,
exploited by mining companies to avoid taxes with damaging
consequences on domestic resource mobilization. Rawls argues that
acting unfairly is not so much about breaking a particular rule, but
taking advantage of the loopholes or ambiguities in rules, insisting
that rules be enforced to one’s advantage when they should be
suspended and acting contrary to the intended spirit of the law.124
120 Elvra Bova, “The Implications of Mine Ownership for the Management of the
Boom: A Comparative Analysis of Zambia and Chile”, Swiss National Center of
Competence Research, Working Paper No. 2009/13 (Bern, 2009).
121 African Development Bank, Gold Mining in Africa: Maximizing Economic Returns
for Countries (Tunis, 2013).
122 Dunn Loren Merrifield, “The Nigerian Cement Industry: Cement Industry
Report”, 11 September,  2014,  p. 54.
123 African Development Bank, Royalty Rates in African Mining Revisited: Evidence
from Gold (Tunis, 2012).
124 John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness”, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 67, No. 2 (1958).
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Mining companies increasingly are accused of violating the principle
of fair play by accepting government’s protection of their property rights
to mine without paying their fair contribution to the functioning of
state through taxes. While illicit financial leakages outside the mining
sector are difficult to estimate, a clear relation exists between countries
that are highly dependent on mining and incidence illicit financial
outflows. The AU/ECA High Level Panel reported extensive under-
reporting of quantity and quality of mineral resources extracted for
export, robbing African people of their benefits. The Report estimates
that over US$50 billion leave the continent yearly, including through
aggressive tax avoidance and evasion schemes as well as abuses of
market power.125 This is greater than the overall external development
assistance to Africa. A recent study of selected commodity-rich countries,
including African,shows that governments are losing almost 67 per
cent of their minerals export in illegal trade mis-invoicing practices.126
Nevertheless, the reliance on internally generated resources rather
than aid, remains crucial for diversifying and transforming mineral-rich
African economies.127 By collecting more taxes, governments will develop
their own governance capacity, including spending even better on critical
infrastructure for linking mining to the broader economy. “Taxation
reflects the intrinsic legitimacy of the state, based on the effectiveness
of institutions manifested in actual compliance.128 An effective system
including capacity for collecting optimal revenues from natural resources
would solidify the often weak social contract between governments
and citizens for equitable delivery of benefits from mining.
In fact, against the depressed market conditions, there continues
to exist considerable scope for mineral-rich African countries to review
current royalty rates. While there are certainly fears of further scaring
125 Economic Commission for Africa, Track It! Stop It! Get It!: Report of the High
Level Panel on Illicit Financial (Addis Ababa, 2015).
126 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Trade, Misinvoicing in
Primary: The Cases of Chile, Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria (Geneva, 2016).
127 African Minerals Development Center, Impact of Illicit Financial Flows on
Domestic Resource Mobilization: Optimizing Revenues from the Mineral Sector in
Africa (Addis Ababa, 2017).
128 Max Everest, “The Political Economy of Controlling Tax Evasion and Illicit
Financial Flows”, eds. In Peter Reuter, Draining Development: Controlling the
Flows of Illicit Funds from Developing Countries, pp. 69-109 (Washington, 2012).
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increasingly hard-to-attract investors with upwardly revised rates,129
the relatively low rates of royalties appears not to have translated into
increased tax revenues for governments in Africa.130 Notably, the rates
were set a long-time ago under pressure of the World Bank and key
international financial institutions as a way of attracting investment.Even
against the just ended surge in commodity prices, resource taxes
including royalties fell from 41 per cent in 1980 to 37.1 per cent as a
share of overall tax revenues in 2010.131 In truth, geology matters more
than tax policies for attracting investors. According to an AfDB study,
the most significant influence on the cost of operating a gold mine was
grade quality, underscoring the influence of geology and geological
information.132 Based on perceptions of business executives, the
influential Fraser Institute reports that only 3.5 per cent of mining
companies surveyed will not invest in Africa due to perceived constraints
imposed by their tax regimes.133
Without a framework underpinned by equity and fairness, any
governance effort will remain limited and ill-equipped to manage the
complex challenges of the mining sector effectively. The Africa Mining
Vision aims at transparent, equitable and optimal exploitation of
mineral resources to underpin broad-based sustainable growth and
socio-economic development.134 The Action Plan aims to optimize the
share of mineral revenue accruing to resource-rich economies. And
through the Country Mining Vision, African countries are developing
fiscal instruments that are underpinned by fairness and equity.
5.2 Policy Stream
African mineral exporters are locked-in at the zero or lowest value-
adding stage of the global mining industry. While the locus of mining
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production moves rapidly to emerging countries, including African,
the centres of value addition and beneficiation, key to industrialization
and structural transformation, remain outside the continent. Most
mining countries in Africa are not only getting the minimum from
exporting their minerals in raw forms, but also limiting opportunities
for greater employment generation, wealth diversification as well as
leaving themselves vulnerable to volatilities of global resource markets.
Annual fluctuation in prices for unprocessed ores averages 23 per cent
against 13 per cent for those that are processed.135 Africa exports about
8 per cent of world’s iron output but shares only 1 per cent of global
steel production, the processed ore, dominated by South Africa.136 Yet
Africa’s potential for steel production is set to grow exponentially with
recent discoveries of substantial iron ores in West Africa.
Despite the continent’s mineral endowment, industrialization is
failing to take root. African countries are unable to turn their natural
resource advantages into engines for internationally competitive
industrial and diversified economies. The share of manufacturing value
added in African GDP has fallen over the years from 16.6 per cent in
1980 to 12.6 per cent in 2009 in sub-Saharan Africa. The values for
North Africa have marginally increased from 12.6 to 13.6 per cent.137
In fact, Africa has even rolled backed its industrialization.138 Many more
countries depend on exporting their minerals raw, a trend that has
accelerated rapidly during the boom at the expense of developing
vibrant, competitive manufacturing sector. Dependence on commodity
exports as share of overall international trade has even increased over
the years, from 0.24 in 1998 to 0.43 in 2011.139
The capacity to design and implement forward-looking policies
aligned with the AMV remains a binding constraint. For example, a
recent study has underscored a self-limiting framing of geological
information in mining legislations across the continent as records rather
135 Economic Commission for Africa, Economic Report for Africa: Making the Most
of Africa’s Commodities: Industrializing for Growth, Jobs and Economic
Transformation (Addis Ababa, 2013).
136 World Steel Association, “World Steel in Figures” (Brussels, 2014).
137 Economic Commission for Africa, Economic Report on Africa: Dynamic Industrial
Policy in Africa (Addis Ababa, 2014).
138 Economic Commission for Africa, Economic Report for Africa: Making the Most
of Africa’s Commodities: Industrializing for Growth, Jobs and Economic
Transformation (Addis Ababa, 2013).
139 Ibid.
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than dataset that could be aggregated and analysed for effective tracking
and monitoring mineral exploration and production along the value
chain.140 The report concludes on the argument that there is little clarity
on the use of the terms “geological information”, “geological
knowledge”, “geological data” and “geological records” in mineral codes
in Africa. With the exception of South Africa, there is no requirement
for precompetitive data submitted to government to be digitalized.
Data submitted are often in PDF formats, which cannot be aggregated.
As a result, African governments are failing to update their national
geological data set, representing almost US$1billion of data acquisition
expenditure.141 African countries are not only losing money, but also
opportunities to attract further investment to their mineral sector.
Studies further show that precompetitive datasets, when made available
to mineral exploration companies, could leverage inward investment
from 3:1 to 20:1 for a number of jurisdictions.142
African countries are not taking advantage of boom periods to plan
for the future. Resource extraction is heavy on capital and light on
employment. Africa’s growth is impressive in general and particularly
for mineral exporting countries, however it has not translated into
increased jobs or higher standards of living for the majority of the
region’s population. Inequality, as measured by Gini coefficient,
increased from 2001 to 2012, the highest after Latin America.143 The
mining sector’s share of employment, which remains even the lowest,
has dropped significantly from 1.5 per cent in 1975 to 0.9 per cent in
2010, in spite of the economic boom. Africa’s output gap that is the
difference between actual and potential growth, from 2001 to 2013
increased, suggesting the potential for purposeful policies for inclusive
structural transformation through industrialization.144
With an underdeveloped industrial base, the gap with other regions
has widened. Participation as raw commodity exporter in the mining
140 African Minerals Development Centre, “Impact of Illicit Financial Flows on
Domestic Resource Mobilization: Optimizing Revenues from the Mineral Sector
in Africa” (Addis Ababa, 2017).
141 World Bank, The Billion Dollar Map, Technical Report, Washington D.C., 2014).
142 Margretha Scott and Malcolm Jones, Management of Public Geoscience Data,
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143 African Development Bank, Income Inequality in Africa (Tunis, 2012).
144 Economic Commission for Africa, Overview of Recent Economic and Social
Development in Africa: Industrialization for Inclusive and Transformative
Development in Africa (Addis Ababa, 2014).
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global value chain further marginalizes Africa. The distance between
other developing countries is not only broader but cumulative and
path-dependent.145 Due to their diversified industrial base, Asian
countries perform better with the same level of growth as Africa. A 10
per cent increase in national income translates into a 20 per cent
reduction in poverty in Asia, against only a 7 per cent reduction in
poverty in Africa.146 At the same time, firm-level survey data shows
that formal manufacturing firms in Africa are generally more productive
in terms of value added per employee when adjusted for levels of GDP
per capita, suggesting the potential for manufacturing.147
Imported capital goods for the extractive sector show poor upstream
linkages to the economy. Yet, increased downstream value-addition
presents an opportunity to diversify and transform economies of mineral
rich countries. A study by the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) of the value chain for a range of minerals found
that the value of processed products was typically 400 times greater
than the equivalent unit value by weight of the raw material.148 Due to
weaker forward, backward and sideward linkages of its mining industry,
Africa accounts only for 1 per cent of global value added in
manufacturing, the same share since 2000.149
Commodity-led development strategies are evolving and changing
in Africa. Owing partly to the AMV, countries are adopting more
development-oriented approaches toward the mining sector.150 While
there is yet to be a systematic study of AMV implementation, many
145 LallSanjaya, “Industrial Success and Failure in a Globalizing World”,
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Center for Global Development (New York, 2014).
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countries are already revising their mineral exploitation regimes to
maximize development benefits, including beneficiation.151 The African
Minerals Development Centre is supporting more than 20 African
countries to implement varied priorities in the AMV.152 For example,
Malawi, Sierra Leone and Lesotho have undertaken comprehensive
reforms of their mineral sector in accordance with the AMV. Zambia
has recently adopted a new mining code that aims for the broad-based
development of the mining sector. Left on their own, market forces are
unlikely to establish those critical industrialization linkages, because
transnational companies already have their own external linkages which
they will want to maximize for greater value and returns across their
global value chains as a whole. Governments are seeking for an optimal
mix of sticks and carrots for the mining industry: proactively identifying
win-win opportunities for developing linkages into and out of the sector
both at domestic and regional economies.
At the same time, increasingly firm-specific opportunities for
linkages are emerging. Lead mining multinational companies in the
value chain, have an active interest to promote linkages in areas outside
of their core competences – defined as capabilities, which are unique
to them, difficult to copy and valued by customers.153 Given the rational
incentive to promote low cost, low inventory production, in addition
to ensuring the constant availability of capital intensive equipment,
many lead commodity firms may not only wish to outsource non-core
competences, but also to near source them. Observably, success
depends on contextual factors, including host country ability to design
and implement active industrial policy in a forward looking manner
and targeting cost-cutting imperatives of key multinational companies.
For example, while there are still some challenges, Botswana is to
strategically develop its downstream sector through partnering with
De-beers, a leading multinational company to create a viable diamond
cutting and polishing industry in the country. There were 16 diamond
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cutting and polishing factories in Botswana in 2011, creating over 2500
jobs.154
Contextual constraints to climb the value-adding chain are at
different levels in countries. The most notable impediments include
poor infrastructure, limited finance, weak environmental regulations,
trade barriers, lack of policy harmonization and regional markets. For
example, due to lack of reliable electricity, Africa is losing 3-5 per cent
of GDP every year.155 In fact, refining base metals alone will require
almost 115 per cent of total electricity currently produced in Africa.156
While some African countries have developed industrial frameworks,
most are yet to develop effective industrial policies. Many more have
not sufficiently linked their industrial, minerals and trade policies in
an integrated fashion. Most lack strategies and incentives on value-
addition that could maximize regional and continental growth
opportunities. Consequently, the share of intra-African trade remains
extremely low compared to other major regions. Over the period from
2007 to 2011, the average share of intra-African exports in total
merchandise exports in Africa was 11 per cent compared with 50 per
cent in developing Asia, 21 per cent in Latin America and the Caribbean
and 70 per cent in Europe. Over the period 2007 to 2011, intraregional
exports amounted to 10.9 per cent of world African exports and the
share of intraregional imports stood at 12.7 per cent.157 However, the
level of value addition in intraregional trade including minerals is far
higher than Africa’s trade with the rest of the world, suggesting the
potential for structural transformation of economies through viable
regional value chains.158
Notably, value addition in an inclusive approach remains central
for viable industrialization. The AMV minerals focused development
lays the foundation for buoyant sustained manufacturing in Africa. The
emphasis on optimizing the full potential of all minerals, including the
154 Letsema Mbayi, Linkages in Botswana’s Diamond Industry: Cutting and Polishing
Industry (Open University, London, 2011).
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often neglected minerals, clearly sets the AMV apart as an idea whose
time has come. Consumption of low value minerals provides critical
feedstocks and inputs for Africa’s industrialization. Domestic
manufactures from limestone and sand, minerals and commodities
often neglected because of their low price, are not only demonstrating
strong resilience but also remarkable transformative potentials of
African economies. Cement manufactured on the continent from
abundant limestone deposits is witnessing a spectacular growth at 5
per cent annual consumption, correlating strongly with Africa’s GDP
as well as suggesting minerals-based structural transformation.159 Based
on multiple regression analysis, an independent industry research,
suggests that a 1 per cent increase in locally manufactured cement
leads to a 5.97 per cent increase in Nigeria’s GDP growth.160
The same happens with phosphate, another low-value mineral used
for manufacturing fertilizers. Phosphate prices have fallen globally, in
line with depressing commodity prices while investment into the
phosphate sector in Africa remains buoyant. The Office Cherifien des
Phosphates, the Moroccan phosphate giant, reported revenues over
the first half of 2015 totalling US$2.5 billion, with second-quarter
adjusted earnings pegged at US$479 million. The company offset a
temporary decline in Brazilian imports by almost doubling its sales
within Africa. Consumption of low value minerals remains critical and
is set to grow in Africa. Africa’s consumption of fertilizer is the lowest
in the world with per capita utilization of nine kilograms per hectare
against a global average of 107 kilograms. Similarly per capita
consumption of cement remains only at 100kg per person as compared
to the global average of 500kg.161
The cement sector is emerging in Africa thanks to AMV-like policies
of local content and value addition. For example, the spectacular
emergence of Nigeria as a net exporter of cement has happened thanks
to focused local content policies for encouraging domestic
manufacturing of cement.162 Consequently, Africa is experiencing its own
159 Ecobank, Middle Africa Insight Series on Commodities (Lagos, 2014).
160 Dunn Loren Merrifield, The Nigerian Cement Industry: Cement Industry Report,
11 September (Lagos, 2014), p. 54.
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first world-class industrial conglomerate of continental reach. Strikingly,
in the downbeat moment, when other mining companies are revisiting
their strategies, the multi-billion dollar Dangote Cement Group is
betting on Africa’s future like never before, tripling its expansion across
the continent.163
Nevertheless, activist industrial policies remain contentious in
development thinking.164 The opportunities for downstream beneficia-
tion of high value minerals remains a challenge. The AMV frames
optimal beneficiation in terms of supporting the development of viable
regional value chains. Most criticisms of the AMV prioritization of
downstream beneficiation fail to take into consideration the regional
dimension. Taking South Africa as an example, a recent report criticized
AMV-like value addition policies for generating rent-seeking incentives
for suboptimal institutional choices incongruent with optimal
development practice.165 Based on selected list of case studies from the
Southern African region (SADC), country case studies, Grynberg and
Sekakela (2015) flag pitfalls of beneficiation in base metals, given the
compression in smelting, refining and semi-fabricate margins since
2004-2005 by China’s active industrial policy on local content.166
In contrast, to most criticisms, the AMV policy interventions are
focused on the demand-side. The Vision is to create international
competitive mining economies in Africa, by correcting market failures
in regional integration processes for the emergence of viable regional
value chains in mining. The continental framework aims to facilitate
the emergence of efficient regional markets for critical feedstocks at a
price and on a scale that are competitive to support industrialization.
In fact, the AMV takes the regional level as a decisive point for
developing and implementing productive linkages through beneficiating
minerals and supporting local manufacturing of inputs for the mines.
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(October 2015).
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5.3 Politics Stream
A confluence of periodic and random events is coming together to
create a momentum for change. The sense of crises in the extractive
sector is set against a background of emerging opportunities at different
levels, with implications for the Africa Mining Vision. The politics stream
is influenced by dynamics in the international and domestic political
economy.
A seemingly new era of development thinking and interventions is
emerging, even though it is still unclear how it will progress. The recently
adopted Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) will guide global
efforts, including those in Africa, to achieve inclusive and structural
transformation of economies in the next 15 years. Unlike the just ended
Millennium Development Goals, the goals, target important challenges
to structural transformation of African countries with implications for
the AMV. The 17 goals and 169 targets underpin principles of fairness
and empowerment, core ideas in the AMV. Specifically, member states
commit to reducing illicit financial flows as well as supporting countries
to integrate greater into value chains and markets. This remains a
conjecture because how do we know that this is going to change the
economic landscape. What we need to know is whether an alignment
is taking place between AMV and the SDGs.
The strong emphasis on domestic resource mobilization resonates
with the AMV paradigm of fairness and empowerment to effectively
mobilize and share revenues from Africa’s minerals. The financing
framework for the long-term goal, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda,
further stresses the importance of domestic resource mobilization with
taxation appearing 36 times in the document endorsed by member
states. The report underlines key principles and tenets of AMV, including
“encourage investment in value addition and processing of natural
resources and productive diversification”. Member states also commit
to addressing”excessive tax incentives … to investment in extractive
industries”.167 The developmental state through industrial policy was
reaffirmed.168
167 United Nations, Addis Ababa Action Agenda for Financing the Post-2015
Development Goals. Report on Financing for Development (Addis Ababa, 2015),
p. 4.
168 Ibid, p. 6.
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Tax transparency is also getting further international traction, with
the adoption of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting proposals by OECD
and G20 countries (OECD, 2013). The 15 Action Points remain so far
the most comprehensive attempt at reforming the broken system of
international tax governance in about 100 years.169 The proposal
addresses loopholes for abusive transfer pricing and beneficial
ownership, major sources of uncontrolled cross-border leakages of much
needed potential tax revenue from the extractive sector in Africa.
Nevertheless, Africa’s ability to take advantage effectively of the
emerging global opportunities will depend on key dynamics in the
international political economy. While Africa participated in a systematic
and proactive manner in shaping the Post-2015 development agenda,170
its role in influencing the OECD-led reforms of the international tax
system remains marginal.171 As a result of limited participation of African
countries in the formulation of the adopted international tax rules, the
continent’s core interests and key priorities for domestic resource
mobilization remain unaddressed in the adopted OECD Base Erosion
and Profit Shifting Action Plan.172 For example, specific and significant
risks of cross-border fiscal leakages from the mineral sector, including
generous tax exemptions that mining companies have explored to the
disadvantage of the host countries, are not included in the package of
reforms adopted.
While steps have been taken to ensure that BEPS implementation
is more inclusive, the fundamental weaknesses of the international
fiscal system remain unaddressed, and this significantly disadvantages
mineral-rich African countries. In fact, the underlying unfair 1920s
compromise for allocating the rights to tax cross-border operations of
multinational companies remain unchanged.173 This compromise favours
169 Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development and Group of Twenty
Countries (OECD), OECD-G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting: Explanatory
Statement (Paris, 2015).
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capital exporting countries with greater taxing rights over capital
importing countries.
The ruling elites in mineral-rich countries in Africa have often
explored the loopholes in international tax system to transfer funds
from the sector abroad illicitly. The recently infamous leaks of financial
information held by major banks in Panama, a tax haven, unveiled a
list of 18 leading government officials from key mineral-rich countries
with multimillion dollar bank accounts in the secrecy jurisdiction.174
The New York Times recently confirmed the widespread use of Shell
companies by some high-level business and government elites in Africa
to facilitate shifting of their ill-gotten wealth from the mineral sector
to tax havens abroad.175
Successfully implementing the AMV would depend on the extent
to which countries can address key binding constraints to
diversification. Meanwhile, the rules of the game in particular the goal
posts of value creation and benefits sharing in the global value chains
are changing. Governance of minerals value chains is becoming more
sophisticated and complex with risks of further marginalizing African
minerals producers. Authority and power relationships that determine
how value is produced and allocated along different activities within
international production networks are evolving, rapidly.176 Value creation
in chain governance is increasingly decoupling from where production
activities are taking place.177
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In fact, value addition activities are increasingly less aligned with
productive activities but more with the ownership of intangible assets
like intellectual property and patents. While productivity in the mining
industry halved over the last two decades178 patents fillings by industry
surprisingly has not only resisted, but also increased entirely.179 The
trend underpins an opacity that favours multinational companies who
own the key capital assets.180 This leads to a rise in intangible assets as
the value creators artificially increases the barrier for African countries
to upgrade sustainably and earn commensurable returns for their
participation within the global value chain.181 “The solution searched
for by capital is now to advance rights to intellectual property in order
to collect monopoly rents.”182
The international frameworks governing minerals resources are
becoming increasingly complex with the proliferation of overlapping
and conflicting initiatives183 underpinned by vested interests, which
risks undermining efforts to implement the AMV. While compliance
remains largely voluntary, some responsible mining initiatives are
mandatory. Almost all of them operating in Africa are driven externally
outside the continent. A recent white paper by the World Economic
Forum identified over 40 voluntary responsible mining initiatives which
are all aspirational, issue-focused, commodity-focused and site-based.184
While a patchwork of externally driven responsible mining
initiatives seems to open space for competition of ideas, they are
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stretching thin the already limited resources for implementing country-
owned, continentally agreed vision for the mineral sector. The agendas
of most of these initiatives are too narrow and misaligned with the
comprehensive priorities adopted by countries for the broad-based
development of the minerals sector. In fact, the dangers of “initiative
fatigue” is real and underscored through the lack of linkages between
the different initiatives, increased transaction costs, and displacement
of capacities in countries.185 Implementation requires focused efforts at
overcoming the vested interests in the way of achieving the AMV.
Despite the proliferations of governance frameworks, there is still
a strong demand for AMV-type initiatives. According to a recent WEF
global survey of stakeholders in the mining sector, the majority of
respondents expressed a need for more comprehensive initiatives in
particular those that can tackle emerging challenges facing the sector,
including commodity price collapse.186  Furthermore, while regulations
were cited as a major driver, it is surprisingly curbing illicit financial
outflows, including abusive transfer pricing that wasnot a priority area
for mineral governance.
Africa continues to project its agency through ownership of
development agenda, with mixed outcomes. The African Union and its
Member States have adopted Agenda 2063, which incorporates the
AMV as the pillar for achieving structural transformation of economies
through the broad-based development of the minerals sector.187 Member
States have committed to implementing both the UN Agenda 2030
and AU Agenda 2063 in an integrated and coherent manner.188 While
both agendas overlapped in most priority areas, there are some
differences, including scale of priorities and calendar of implementation.
Notably, the traditional dependence on aid and potential of
disproportionate donor resources going to support countries to achieve
the United Nations global goals may marginalize the implementation
of the AU Agenda 2063, the continentally owned framework.
185 Ibid, p. 4.
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African countries will need to sustain their position; most
continental initiatives continue to depend heavily on external funds
for their implementation, which often are misaligned with agreed
priorities of Member States. While efforts have increased significantly
in the continent to generate own resources to support key initiatives,
success remains a work in progress. For example, the AU’s operational
budget is funded almost entirely from donor’s contributions. In fact,
Member States finance only 33 per cent of the US$428 million budget.189
The initial funding for the African Minerals Development Centre
responsible for implementing the AMV was provided by Canada and
Australia.190
However, the African Union has recently adopted a proposal to
generate internal resources from the continent in a sustainable manner
to finance the Union and its continental initiatives (AUC, 2016). The
new financing model, which is due to be implemented in 2017, aims
to levy a 0.2 per cent tax on imports to the continent towards financing
AU operations. Besidesadministrative complexity that challenges
implementation, overcoming real politics often played by member states
will be crucial.
The AMV will need to facilitate the emergence of inclusive pan-
African identities around mineral value chains based on economic
interests around linkages, and do so in ways that organize citizens,
communities and elites for the transformation of the continent. How
to mutuallycombine political and economic identities, as well as
territorial based identities anchored around maximizing rents with
economic identities anchored in optimizing productive activities within
value chains remains a challenge. While mining remains a site-based
activity, value creation occurs through linkages, which may be
misaligned with electoral maps and election cycles. Pursuing a strategy
of broadening linkages with the rest of the economy may go against
the narrow expectations of voting constituencies of the ruling elites.
For example, a regional-based approach to developing key infrastructure
linkages with the Simandou Iron Ore Project, the largest integrated
189 African Union Commission, Executive Council, “Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session”
(Addis Ababa, 2015).
190 Africa Minerals Development Centre, “Partners Report”, Unpublished (Addis
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mining and infrastructure project contemplated in Africa, remains
optimal.191
Observably the Government of Guinea allegedly “pressured Rio
Tinto to route the rail link through Conakry” which offer limited linkages
but high potential to maximize electoral gains for the Government
than the initial proposal to route the planned railway through Liberia
with potential for maximum development returns.192 The rail link
through Liberia will benefit both countries and the region more in
economic terms and would require only upgrading and minimal
extension, as opposed to building a new 700 km line at a cost of
approximately US$10 billion through Conakry.193
Leveraging the transformative potential of minerals will require
nudging domestic elites – ruling, business and bureaucrats – towards a
shared vision and interests in taking advantage of mineral value chains.
Yet altering local power dynamics and relationships between different
groups and interests for the broad-based transformation of the minerals
sector requires more than a technical policy fix. It remains highly
political and complex, with far-reaching implications on local, national
and regional politics.
Effective local content strategies remain a test bed for transforming
power relations in the mining sector. Policies to encourage mining
companies to procure inputs locally provide an opportunity for
integrating the sector within the local, national and regional economies.
While most mineral-rich African countries have adopted local content
policies, success remains mixed.194 As a result of vested interests in
part, local content strategies are framed narrowly around domestic
ownership rather than extent of local value addition within national
economies.195 Most countries are yet to incorporate the regional
dimension in their local content policies, despite the obvious benefits.196
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Guinea: Examination of the Simandou Iron Ore Project”, SAIIA Policy Brief 83
(2015), p. 4.
193 Ibid.
194 Isabelle Ramdoo, Local Content Policies in Mineral-rich Countries: An Overview,
European Center for Development Policy Management (Maastricht, 2016).
195 World Bank, Increasing Local Procurement by the Mining Industry in West Africa,
Report No. 66585-AFR (Washington, 2012).
196 Isabelle Ramdoo, Local Content Policies in Mineral-rich Countries: An Overview,
European Center for Development Policy Management (Maastricht, 2016).
2017 THE AFRICAN MINING VISION 189
As the light of transparency shines brighter on revenue manage-
ment, local content appears to emerge as a new black box for elite rent
seeking, undermining the potential for broad-based transformation of
economies. In examining the political economy of mining in Africa,
Hansen, et al (2015) argue that the current power balance in the
domestic elites’ constellations is sustained by capturing rents from the
sector.197 And transforming the relationship away from rents to
sustainable revenue mobilization through productive and higher value
adding activities may threaten clientele settlements between business
and politics as well as stability of regimes in countries. 198
The merchant class of traders and importers heavily dominate
business and political relationships in Africa. Arguably an inheritance
of colonialism, the industrialist business class in Africa with genuine
interests to take advantage of linkages through manufacturing remain
marginalized and almost absent in most countries.199 Local content
provides a transformative opportunity to change the structure of
economies by actively encouraging the emergence of local entrepreneurs
committed to manufacture inputs into the mines. Buur (2014) shows
how local content policies in Mozambique have been captured by elites
who used their privileged access to information and power to create
small and medium size enterprises just for the sole purpose of capturing
contractsto import supplies to the mining industry, at the expense of
genuine entrepreneurs with capability to manufacture inputs locally.200
Using Ghana as case study, Ablo (2016), concludes that while local
content laws have been beneficial to local elites, it has not stimulated
broad-based social and economic transformations.201 He further argues
that embedded power relationship among elites have shaped the
outcomes away from value addition to rent seeking. Based on
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experiences in Angola, Amundsen (2014) observes that domestic
entrepreneurs with genuine interests to take advantage of productive
linkages need in addition to their ideas, capacity and finance support
from patronage networks of power and rent-seeking to succeed.202
Overcoming the political economy constraints requires a strong
constituency for change. Engagement of the discourse community,
knowledge networks and advocacy coalitions in Africa around AMV
priorities for broad-based development of the mining sector remains
limited. Since its adoption in 2009, very few peer reviewed articles on
the AMV have been published. In addition, successful implementation
will require strengthening the capacity of African-based non-
governmental organizations and community-based groups in particular
on issues around linkages and value addition through beneficiation.
So far, accountability, environment and human rights issues around
mining dominate the activities of most NGOs operating on the continent.
Marginal work exists on the linkages and spatial dimensions of mining,
which is at the heart of the AMV.
6.  POSSIBLE CHANGE SCENARIOS
How all three streams add up in ways that effectively open windows
for change remains complex, dynamic and difficult to predict with
certainty. The outcomes depends on varied factors including how the
AMV ideational foundation is capable of organizing interests, institu-
tions, actors and power for change. To examine possible trajectories of
change, we appeal
to the Boin et al (2009) policy change framework. A two by three
matrix of key independent variables applies (see Figure 2). Based on
different permutations of path to change, six possible AMV scenarios
are identified.
202 Inge Amundsen, “Drowning in Oil: Angola’s Institutions and the Resource
Curse”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 46, No. 2 (2014), pp. 169-189.
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Advocate for AMV Advocate for AMV
Incremental Wholesome
Resist Policy Change Scenario I. Partially Scenario II. Very unlikely
Unlikely Stalement/politically imposed
Stalement/politically AMV paradigm shift.
imposed incremental
AMV change.
Contain Policy Scenario III. Very Scenario IV. Likely
Change Highly Likely Major swift rhetorical/
Negotiated incremental symbolic change, but no
adjustment to take fundamental shift towards
into consideration adoption of AMV ‘deep core’
some AMV core ideas ideas, principles and tenets.
and mechanisms for
implementation.








Following the current commodity slump, the Africa Mining Vision faces
its greatest ever challenge since the African Heads of States adopted it
in 2009. This paper assessed the ideational foundation of the AMV in
the context of the depressed and volatile markets for minerals as well
as the continent’s priority for structural transformation of economies
through minerals-based linkages.
It argued that the crunch presents an opportunity for African
countries to implement AMV as a forward-looking, multidimensional
paradigm that goes beyond maximizing revenues from commodity
cycles. The article shows that the AMV is underpinned by a robust
ideational foundation capable of steering governments through
commodity downturns by building lasting institutions for broad-based
development of the mineral sector.
Based on a multivariate model of policy change, problem, policy,
and politics, as well as interests-based networks, the article developed
a dynamic conceptual framework to assess the potential of establishing
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the AMV as a paradigm whose time has come. The crisis presents an
opportunity, which the article analyses emphasizing the binding political
economy constraints African governments will have to overcome at
the global, regional and country levels in order to implement the
transformative ideas of the AMV.
A matrix systematically analysing possible scenarios in the way of
implementing the Africa Mining Vision is presented. While AMV remains
a paradigm whose time has come for extractive-led development
strategies, its implementation would likely be non-linear. Resistance
to change and different contexts of countries could lead to an
incremental implementation of AMV.
